

RECOMMENDATION

6. In the preparation of appraisals of intelligence indicators less emphasis should be placed on achieving unanimity in "Watch Report" productions and Watch Committee procedures should be modified to assure that "Watch Reports" reflect significant differences of view which may be developed in the course of the estimative process. (See the Board's report to the President, dated January 22, 1962, on "Review of Advance Intelligence Pertaining to the Berlin Wall and Syrian Coup Incidents.")

This comment is accurate as far as it goes. Significant differences have been reflected in the Watch Report in the established fashion of NIEs, as footnotes. Certainly, the reflection of significant differences must be encouraged. This is a managerial responsibility of the USIB and the Watch Committee, and conventions can easily be found to reflect differing views without the administrative and policy awkwardnesses that are often entailed in footnotes. This point seems to be irrelevant to the performance of NIC, whose tasks of coordination would be materially eased if such conventions were adopted. Indeed, NIC members have consistently argued toward this end. It is doubtful that the establishment of a "DIA/CIIC-NIC" would affect this question one way or the other, and an experienced NIC would bring to the delicacies involved considerably more practical background and productive techniques.

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It could be observed here that the reflection of differing points of view and of differing judgments as to the validity of indicators is far more likely to occur in a truly interagency staff like the NIC which is directly subordinate to a USIB subcommittee than would be possible in an organization organically a part of a member agency of USIB. It is humanly impossible for the members of such a proposed organization not to be affected in their judgments as to the validity of indications by the established position of DIA as an agency, by DIA's estimates, by DIA's politics and by the personal prejudices and predispositions of senior DIA people. An interagency NIC is apt to be considerably freer to raise items as potential indications than a DIA Center necessarily governed by DIA's already set views.

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7. Any indications center of a national character that may be established should enjoy adequate priority in the intelligence community; and should have adequate data processing facilities to ensure getting full value from the information which it collects.

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In summary, it would seem that the very difficult indications of imminence of hostilities mission would not be facilitated by assigning this role to the Defense Indications Center and by supplementing the staff of that Center with appropriate personnel from State, CIA, NSA and other USIB agencies concerned. Under this concept it would seem essential that, in performing such a national Indications Intelligence/Information mission, the Center should be fully responsive to the DCI, the USIB and the Watch Committee. In addition, it should be authorized to place requirements for all indicator-type intelligence on all elements of the intelligence community, both civilian and military.

As noted above, it is hard to see how a Defense Indications Center newly established and in a newly established organization even though supplemented with personnel from other agencies could handle the strategic warning mission any better than NIC now does with its operational seasoning and eight years of experience. The Defense Intelligence Agency Center might have a better charter, but then the same thing could be accomplished even better if the Charter of the Watch Committee and the NIC were revised to accomplish what is desired for the DIC, and without the loss of the experience NIC possesses. It is also difficult to see how a Defense Center could be fully responsive to the DCI, USIB and the Watch Committee when it must also be even more responsive to the needs of the Department of Defense and DIA. In a difference of opinion between the DCI and the head of DIA, the position of such a center would be awkward indeed and its ability to serve the DCI as the should be served would be under some question. As to requirements, these are adequately and regularly handled in an orderly manner through the members of the Watch Committee who represent agencies who possess the collection facilities on which the requirements are laid. It can be assumed that the collection agencies of the intelligence community are doing their best at this point; it is difficult to see how a reallocation of warning responsibility would improve their operations or in any way reduce the barriers the enemy continues to put in our way to getting what we need.

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